




Cannabis Use and Support for Cannabis Legalization




Early version, also known as pre-print
Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Palali, A., & van Ours, J. C. (2014). Cannabis Use and Support for Cannabis Legalization. (CentER Discussion
Paper; Vol. 2014-027). Economics.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
























CANNABIS USE AND SUPPORT  


























Cannabis Use and Support for Cannabis Legalization
Ali Palali ∗ and Jan C. van Ours †‡§
April 8, 2014
Abstract
We investigate the determinants of the support for cannabis legalization finding a causal effect
of personal experience with cannabis use. Current and past cannabis users are more in favor
of legalization. We relate this to self-interest and inside information about potential dangers
of cannabis use. While the effects of self-interest are not very surprising, the effect of inside
information suggests that cannabis use may not be as harmful as cannabis users originally
thought it was and not as harmful as non-users are inclined to think it is.
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1 Introduction
In many countries the production, use and distribution of cannabis is prohibited. However, the legal
framework on cannabis is changing as some countries are becoming more tolerant. The Netherlands
quasi-legalized cannabis use through the introduction of “coffeeshops” which are licensed cannabis
sales outlets. Recently, in two states in the U.S. – Washington and Colorado – a state licensing
system for production and supply of cannabis to retail outlets was introduced. There are several
alternatives to prohibition varying from decriminalization to regulation and legalization (European
Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction (2013)). Whereas decriminalization refers to
the removal of the criminal status for personal possession or use, regulation refers to limits on
access and restrictions on advertizing. Legalization refers to cannabis use and cannabis supply,
making lawful what previously was prohibited. Although in the policy debate a distinction is
made between legalization and regulation of cannabis, we consider regulation as legalization under
restrictions and focus on the dichotomy between prohibition and legalization.1 In the policy debate
on cannabis legalization there are frequent references to studies which find that cannabis use has
adverse effects on physical and mental health as well as other negative effects on important life
outcomes such as educational attainment and labor market position (Ellickson et al. (1999), Brook
et al. (1999), French et al. (2001), Arseneault et al. (2004), Van Ours (2006), Van Ours (2007),
Van Ours et al. (2013)). In their overview study on the effects of cannabis use, Van Ours and
Williams (2014) conclude that there do not appear to be serious harmful health effects of moderate
cannabis use but there is evidence of reduced mental well-being for heavy users who are susceptible
to mental health problems. Furthermore, they conclude that while there is robust evidence that
early cannabis use reduces educational attainment, there remains substantial uncertainty as to
whether using cannabis has adverse labor market effects.
While in the previous studies cannabis use is related to outcome variables such as health, edu-
cation and labor market outcomes, in the current paper we follow a different strategy to establish
whether cannabis use has harmful effects. We analyze the determinants of opinions on the legaliza-
tion of cannabis. We argue that differences in opinions between non-users, current users and past
users of cannabis are informative about potential dangers of cannabis use. If cannabis use changes
the opinion in favor of legalization of cannabis this is evidence that cannabis use may not be as
1What the optimal cannabis policy is from an economic point of view is not clear. A lot of the economic arguments
are based on the tradeoff between legalizing cannabis which would allow taxes to be introduced on cannabis use or
prohibiting cannabis use because it is easier to limit cannabis supply than to implement taxation. See for studies
that analyze the pros and cons of legalization Becker et al. (2006), Caulkins et al. (2012), Glaeser and Shleifer (2001),
Miron and Zwiebel (1995).
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harmful as individuals originally thought.
It is well-known that cannabis users are more in favor of legalization than non-users. This is
confirmed in a European study on youth attitudes toward drugs (European Commission (2011)).
Individuals aged 15-24 years in the 27 EU-countries were asked to report their opinions on specific
cannabis policies. On average, 60 percent of the youngsters think that cannabis use should be
banned, while 40 percent thinks it should be legalized (with or without restrictions). Figure 1
shows that in EU-countries where the percentage of youngsters who ever used cannabis is high,
also the support for legalization of cannabis use is high. The graph also shows the situation in
the USA where among youngsters of 18-29 years old 36 percent ever tried cannabis and 69 percent
thinks that cannabis use should be legalized. In terms of the combination of cannabis use and
opinions on legalization the USA and the Netherlands are not very different. Admittedly, Figure
1 is based on only cross-country averages. Nevertheless, more detailed studies have also found
that cannabis users are more in favor of legalizing cannabis and less in favor of prohibition than
individuals who have never used cannabis. For example, according to a U.S. study which used data
collected in 1997 and 1998 in Houston, 68% of drug users were in favor of legalizing cannabis, while
only 33% of the non-drug users were in favor (Trevino and Richard (2002)). A study from Norway
performed in 1989 shows that 65% of cannabis users were in favor of prohibition of cannabis while
among non-users this was 95% (Skretting (1993)). In the Netherlands, in 2008, among cannabis
users only 7% was in favor of prohibition of cannabis, while this was 50% among non-users (Van der
Sar et al. (2011)). In Australia, in 1998, 57% of cannabis users were in favor of legalizing cannabis
while among the non-users this was only 18% (Williams et al. (2011)).
All in all, several studies suggest that support for cannabis legalization is higher among cannabis
users. Interesting as this may be in itself, the fact that cannabis users are more in favor of legalizing
cannabis does not necessarily imply that opinions are influenced by cannabis use in a causal way.
It could be that individuals who are more likely to consume cannabis are also more in favor of
legalization without personal experience affecting opinions. Knowing whether or not there is a
causal effect from cannabis use to opinions is interesting because if there is a causal effect, this
reveals how potential dangers of cannabis use are assessed. If cannabis use has a favorable effect
on opinions about cannabis legalization then this may reveal that cannabis use is not as harmful as
what it is originally believed. However, such a causal effect may also have to do with self-interest,
i.e. cannabis legalization leading to easier access to cannabis and perhaps lower prices. We argue
that is is possible to make a distinction between inside information and self-interest by comparing
how past cannabis use and current cannabis use affect opinions. Whereas the effect of current
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cannabis use may be a mixture of self-interest and inside information, the effect of past cannabis
use is related to inside information only.
The concept of self-interest and information in opinions about public policy is not new in
empirical studies. Using Californian data, Green and Gerken (1989) find that self-interest plays
a decisive role in forming attitudes toward restrictions on smoking and cigarette taxes. Similarly,
Funk (2000) and Timberlake et al. (2003) show that when self-interest is involved in decisions about
public policies, individuals may act in a way that is beneficial to themselves. Using the same data
set as we do, Van der Sar et al. (2011) and Van der Sar et al. (2012) find that those who have
never used cannabis are more likely to support prohibition of cannabis in the Netherlands. Using
the results of a national survey, Skretting (1993) studies the attitude of the Norwegian population
on drug policies finding that those who use cannabis do not consider drug possession as a serious
crime. Trevino and Richard (2002), using data from US drug users, find that drug consumers
have different attitudes towards drug policies. Although these studies clearly show that there is a
significant difference between cannabis users and non-users in the opinions about cannabis policies,
they do not establish whether this has to do with a causal relationship. The only study that
establishes a causal relationship between user status and opinions on cannabis policy is Williams
et al. (2011). They analyze Australian data from cross-sectional surveys over the period 1993 to
2007 using a quasi-panel approach to account for potential endogeneity of cannabis use. The main
conclusion is that past users preference for legalization is consistent with information on net benefits
of cannabis use while self-interest as contributing to current users support for legalization cannot
be ruled out. Although focusing on a similar research question, our study differs from theirs in
many aspects including the econometric specification, identification strategy and the findings.2
In the empirical part of our analysis, we use a statistical model that allows us to establish
the causal effects of cannabis use on opinions about cannabis policies. We focus on two policy
statements in a survey conducted in the Netherlands in 2008. Individuals were asked to indicate
their support for statements on prohibition and legalization of cannabis. We estimate simultaneous
models that integrate cannabis use dynamics and opinions on cannabis use. We find that cannabis
user status is correlated with opinions on cannabis legalization. This correlation partly reflects
a causal effect. Current cannabis users and past cannabis users seem to have learned from their
2Some of the main difference are: Williams et al. (2011) use a quasi-panel approach and apply an Arellano-Bond
(AB) procedure to take account of endogeneity of cannabis use. The results presented by the authors show that
magnitude of the effect of cannabis use on opinions increases once endogeneity is taken into account. Using a discrete
factor approach we find that the effects of cannabis use on opinions decrease once endogeneity is taken into account.
Furthermore, thanks to the well informative nature of the Dutch data, we are able to perform several sensitivity
checks and a wide range of robustness analysis to support our findings.
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experiences and are therefore more in favor of legalizing cannabis. Current cannabis users are more
in favor of legalizing cannabis than past cannabis users. This suggests that self-interest plays a role
in opinions about cannabis policies but more interestingly, it also suggests that cannabis use may
not be as harmful as non-users are inclined to think.3
Our contribution to the literature on the economics of cannabis use is threefold. First, we present
an analysis of opinions on cannabis policies in a quasi-legal environment. The Dutch respondents
have no incentive to misreport as there is nothing illegal about using cannabis. Because of the
quasi-legal environment they are also familiar with potential consequences of making cannabis
easily available. Second, we establish a causal link from cannabis use to opinions on cannabis
policy. Third, we present a novel strategy to investigate the assessment of potential harmful effects
by distinguishing between self-interest and inside information.
The set-up of our paper is as follows. In section 2 we give a brief overview of cannabis policy in
the Netherlands. In section 3 we discuss our data and give some stylized facts. Section 4 presents
our empirical model and in section 5 we discuss our baseline parameter estimates together with
estimates from several sensitivity and falsification/placebo analysis. Section 6 finally concludes.
2 Cannabis Policy in the Netherlands
As indicated in the introduction, in the Netherlands, cannabis use is quasi-legalized. Small quan-
tities of cannabis can be bought in cannabis-shops. These are retail outlets and referred to as
“coffeeshops”. Cannabis policy is focused on health issues (De Graaf et al. (2010)) and can be
summarized as tolerant (Van Solinge (1999)). The basic aim of the cannabis policy is to lessen the
potential harm to users and their environment. Although cannabis together with other forms of
soft drugs are tolerated by Dutch authorities, use, production and trade of hard drugs are classified
as serious offenses (Palali and van Ours (2013)). The distinction between soft and hard drugs in
terms of legal measures is at the heart of drug policy. The intention is to provide an organized en-
vironment for cannabis sale, keeping potential customers away from dealers of more harmful illicit
drugs and having a control over the quality of cannabis. Coffeeshops are regulated by law. Some
of the fundamental rules are: no sale of hard drugs, no advertising, no sale to youngsters below
18 years of age, no nuisance and no more than 500 grams of cannabis on the premises. Failures
to operate within the regulations might result in shutting down of the shop. The duration of shut
3Note that the expectation about the effect of past use on opinions is not very clear. It can be also the case
that past users face with the negative effects of cannabis use and regret the fact that they have used cannabis. Our
empirical findings also answer this questiong suggesting that there seems to be no regret.
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down depends on the seriousness of the violations committed by the owners of coffeeshops.
The 1980s stand as a crucial period in the history of Dutch cannabis policies. In 1980, the policy
of tolerance of coffeeshops was publicly announced by Dutch authorities and this announcement was
followed by a sharp increase in the number of coffeeshops (Jansen (1991)). In the mid 1990s there
were around 1500 coffeeshops. However, in the 1990s the tolerant cannabis policy was increasingly
criticized from inside the country as well as from other countries. In 1995, the Dutch government
made changes in the rules under which coffeeshops could operate. From 1996 onwards the limit for
personal possession of cannabis was decreased from 30 grams to 5 grams. Moreover the monitoring
and punishment of production and trade of cannabis were increased and more importantly local
governments were given the opportunity to decide whether or not they wanted to have a cannabis-
shop in their municipality. These policies caused a substantial decrease in the number of coffeeshops
(Bieleman et al. (2007)). In 1999, there were 846 coffeeshops across the Netherlands, a number
that went down to 651 in 2011.
3 Data and Stylized Facts
3.1 Data
Our data are from the 2008 Alcohol and Drugs study, one of the assembled studies of the Dutch
Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social Sciences (LISS) panel. In this specific survey respon-
dents were invited to answer various questions about their opinions on different types of government
policies on cannabis. Furthermore, respondents were asked whether they had ever used cannabis
and if they answered affirmatively they were faced with the question: At what age, approximately,
did you first use cannabis? Individuals were also asked to report if they were currently using
cannabis, i.e. whether they had used cannabis in the previous 30 days. Because older individuals
were never confronted with cannabis supply, we perform our analysis on individuals who were born
in 1960 and later. It appears that about 20% of the respondents ever used cannabis whereas less
than 5% used cannabis in the previous 30 days. The latter are considered to be current users
whereas the others are considered to be past users. A description and summary statistics of all
variables used in our analysis are given in Appendix 1.
We use information on past cannabis use and current cannabis use, together with the retro-
spective question on the age of first cannabis use to perform an analysis of cannabis use dynamics.
Figure 2 shows the dynamics in cannabis use. Panel a shows that the starting rate for cannabis
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use has a peak at age 17. The probability to use cannabis for the first time is at its highest point
at age of 17. There are other smaller peaks at age 19 and 21. After age 25 the probability of using
cannabis conditional on not using before virtually becomes zero. Panel b confirms this finding
by showing that the slope of the line representing the cumulative probability of using cannabis
becomes very small after age 25.
3.2 Stylized Facts
In the main part of our empirical analysis, we focus on two statements. The respondents were
asked to indicate their opinion on a scale from 1 to 5 ranging from definitely disagree to definitely
agree with the following statement: cannabis should be prohibited. We rescaled the responses given
to this statement assuming that those who indicated to agree with it would disagree with the
statement that cannabis should be legalized and vice versa. The respondents were also asked to
report their opinion on the statement coffeeshops should be allowed to sell cannabis. We assume
that this statement on coffeeshops is equivalent to a statement on the current status of cannabis
policy in the Netherlands. Panels a and b of Table 1 present the distribution of opinions for the
full sample and sub-samples distinguished by user status. On average, the responses are evenly
distributed; 45% of the sample agree that cannabis should be legalized whereas another 34% state
that they disagree. The remaining 21% is indifferent. Similarly, 46% of the individuals state that
they agree with the idea of selling cannabis through coffeeshops whereas 35% disagree.4
Dividing the sample into 3 categories based on user status exhibits interesting results. Among
current cannabis users only 1 percent definitely disagree and 2 percent disagree that cannabis should
be legalized whereas 89 percent agrees. Similarly 85% of the current users of cannabis agree with
the statement that coffeeshops should be allowed to sell cannabis. These percentages are different
for past users of cannabis of whom 77% disagrees with prohibition whereas 9% agrees with this
idea. Similarly 74% of the past cannabis users agree with the statement that coffeeshops should be
allowed sell cannabis. The numbers are reversed for those who have never used cannabis in their
lives. Almost half of the never users state that they disagree with the idea of legalization whereas
only 31% of the never users agree. Among the never users only 32% agree with coffeeshops while
45% of these respondents disagree.
The last column in Table 1 presents the p-values of a chi-square test where we test if the
4If no birth year restriction is imposed on the sample, these figures are 39% and 43%, respectively. In 1998 this
distribution was very much the same: Back then, 43% of the Dutch population of 19 years and older thought that
coffeeshops were admissible while 46% thought they were not admissible (Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau (1998)).
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differences between reported percentages among current, past and never users are statistically
significant as compared to never users, never users and ever users respectively. For most of the
policy statements, the raw data indicates that there are significant differences in opinions about
cannabis policies depending on the user status.
4 Empirical Model
4.1 Cannabis use dynamics
In the analysis of cannabis use starting rates, we assume that individuals become vulnerable to the
risk of cannabis use from age 13 onwards. We specify the starting rate for cannabis use at time t
(t = 0 at age 12) conditional on observed characteristics x and unobserved characteristics u as
θc(t | x, u) = λc(t) exp(x′βc + u) (1)
where βc represent the effects of independent variables and λc(t) represents individual duration
(age) dependence. Unobserved heterogeneity, in this case, is denoted with u which controls for
differences in individuals’ unobserved susceptibility to cannabis use. We model duration (age)
dependence in a flexible way by using a step function λc(t) = exp(ΣkλkIk(t)), where k (= 1,..,8) is
a subscript for age categories and Ik(t) are time-varying dummy variables that are one in subsequent
categories, 7 of which are for individual ages (age 13, ..,19) and the last interval is for ages above
19 years. Because we also estimate a constant term, we normalize λc,1 = 0.
The conditional density function of the completed durations until the uptake of cannabis use
can be written as
fc(t | x, u) = θc(t | x, u) exp(−
∫ t
0
θc(s | x, u)ds) (2)
We integrate out the unobserved heterogeneity such that density function for the duration of time
until cannabis uptake t conditional on x is
fc(t | x) =
∫
u
fc(t | x, u)dG(u) (3)
where G(u) is assumed to be a discrete mixing distribution with 2 points of support ua and ub
reflecting the presence of two types of individuals in the hazard rate for cannabis uptake. The
associated probabilities are denoted as follows: Pr(u = ua) = r and Pr(u = ub + ua) = 1− r with
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0 ≤ r ≤ 1, and r is modeled using a logit specification, r = exp(α)1+exp(α) .
To account for the discrete nature of the observations of age of onset of cannabis use, the
loglikelihood is specified as
n∑
i=1
dc,i log [Fc(ti − 1)− Fc(ti)] + (1− dc,i) log [1− Fc(ts,i)] (4)
where i is an index for individual, n is the number of individuals in the sample and dc,i is a dummy
variable that is equal to 1 if an individual started using cannabis and equal to 0 if an individual
did not start using cannabis before being interviewed at age ts.
In addition to starting rates of cannabis use, we also estimate quitting rates in order to have a
complete analysis of cannabis use dynamics. The LISS panel includes questions on the last month
use of cannabis. We assume that if the individual reports no use of cannabis in the last 30 days,
that individual stopped using cannabis in time period starting from the first use of cannabis until
30 days prior to the survey. The conditional density function for the completed durations until the
last use of cannabis can be written as
fq(τ | x1, v) = θq(x1, v) exp(−θq(x1, v) · τ) (5)
Even though we do not observe the exact time of quitting in terms of age of respondents, we can
still analyze the duration of quitting thanks to the interval censored nature of the data. However,
note that due to the uncertainty about the exact time of quitting, duration dependence is not
estimated here. On the other hand it is certain that the duration of cannabis use, τ , will lie in
the interval [0,τq] where τq is the difference between age at the time of survey and the age of the
first use. This means that we can integrate out the conditional density function over this period to
account for the uncertainty of quitting time and obtain the distribution function, Fq. Individuals
who report using cannabis in the last 30 days are assumed to be right censored in their quitting
i.e. those who did not quit. Since the quitting analysis is performed only on those who ever use
cannabis there are no left censored individuals. As in the analysis of the uptake of cannabis, we
assume that there are 2 unobserved heterogeneity groups where the probabilities are assumed to
follow a logistic distribution. The loglikelihood is specified as
m∑
i=1
dq,i log [Fq(τq,i)] + (1− dq,i) log [1− Fq(τq,i)] (6)
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where m is the number of individuals that ever used cannabis and dq,i is a dummy variable which
has a value of 1 if the individual stopped using cannabis and a value of 0 if the individual did not
stop using cannabis.
Finally, we allow for the possibility that conditional on the observed characteristics, the age
of uptake and the duration of use cannabis uptake and cannabis quits are correlated through
unobserved characteristics. The joint density of completed durations until the uptake of cannabis
use and completed durations of cannabis use is specified as:





fc(t | x1, v)fq(τ | x2, u)dG(u, v) (7)
where G(u, v) is the joint distribution of unobserved heterogeneity which assume to be discrete
with an unknown number of support points.
4.2 Opinions on cannabis policy
We first model the determinants of opinions on cannabis policy assuming that the dynamics in
cannabis use are exogenous. Then we take possible correlation between the two processes into
account. Individuals report their opinions on the relevant cannabis policy statements on a scale of
1 to 5; with 1 representing definitely disagree and 5 representing definitely agree. In order to exploit
this ordinal character of the dependent variable, we use an ordered probit model with Heckman
and Singer type discrete unobserved heterogeneity (Heckman and Singer (1984)). The unobserved
latent variable in the ordered response model is defined as
y∗ = x′2βp + ρccc + ρpcp + ε+ e (8)
where cc represent current cannabis use, cp represents past cannabis use and ε controls for discrete
type of unobserved heterogeneity which is different from the error term e that represents the random
error term. The parameters of interest in our study are ρc and ρp which measure the effect of current
and past use of cannabis on the opinions about cannabis policy statements. Furthermore, βp
measures the effect of our control variables whose descriptions and summary statistics are provided
in detail in Appendix 1. The observed responses on the cannabis policy statements in the data are,
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then, assumed to be
y =

1 (Definitely disagree) if y∗ ≤ µ1
2 (Disagree) if µ1<y
∗ ≤ µ2
3 (Indifferent) if µ2<y
∗ ≤ µ3
4 (Agree) if µ3<y
∗ ≤ µ4
5 (Definitely agree) if µ4<y
∗
(9)
where µ’s are to be estimated threshold parameters in the ordered choice models. Assuming that
the error term e has a standard normal distribution, we can write the following probabilities for
the ordered probit model conditional on observable and unobservable individual heterogeneity5:
Pr(y = 1|x3, ε) = Φ(µ1 − x′3βp − ε)
Pr(y = 2|x3, ε) = Φ(µ2 − x′3βp − ε)− Φ(µ1 − x′3βp − ε)
.
Pr(y = 5|x3, ε) = 1− Φ(µ4 − x′3βp − ε)
. (10)
Where Φ(.) is standard normal cdf. Unconditional probabilities, then, can be written as
Pr(y = j|x3) =
∫
ε
Prob(y = j|x3, ε)dG(ε) (11)
where j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, denoting ordered responses. G(ε) is assumed to be a discrete mixing
distribution with 2 points of support εa and εb indicating that conditional on observed characteristics
there are 2 types of individuals in the ordered responses given to the policy statements. The
associated probabilities are denoted as follows: Pr(ε = εa) = p and Pr(ε = εb + εa) = 1 − p with
0 ≤ p ≤ 1, where p is modeled using a logit specification, p = exp(α)1+exp(α) .
There are a number of assumptions and normalizations which need to be made for model
identification. First, we assume that mean and variance of the error term e in the latent equation
are 0 and 1, respectively. Since we have heterogeneity specific constants in the model, we also
set the first threshold parameter µ1 to zero. The other threshold parameters are modeled in the
following way in order to ensure that probabilities are positive and thresholds are ordered: µ2 = γ
2
1 ,
µ3 = µ2 + γ
2
2 and µ4 = µ3 + γ
2
3 . Finally, we write the likelihood function of the ordered choice
model as
∏
N Prob(y = j|x3).
5For simplicity we write x′3βp = x
′
2βp + ρccc + ρpcp
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Until now, when estimating the ordered probit model for opinions, we assume that the decision
to use cannabis is exogenous, i.e. independent from any factor that would affect the opinions
about cannabis policies. However it is possible that there are unobserved personal characteristics
that affect both the decision to use cannabis and opinions about cannabis policies. If, for example,
certain individuals have an inclination toward cannabis use due to some intrinsic factors that would
also lead them to have positive attitudes towards liberal cannabis policies, then we might end up
with significant parameter estimates for ρc and ρp even though there is no causal relationship. In
order to control for correlation between unobserved characteristics and establish a causal effect,
we jointly estimate the ordered probit model and the mixed proportional hazard models following
a discrete factor approach. The joint density function of the completed duration of uptake of
cannabis, the duration of cannabis use and opinions on cannabis use is specified as:







fc(t | x1, v)fq(τ | x2, u)Prob(y = j | x3, ε)dG(v, w, ε) (12)
where G(v, w, ε) is a discrete mixing distribution underlying unobserved heterogeneity affecting age
of onset of cannabis use, duration of use and opinions about cannabis policies. This approach is
introduced by Heckman and Singer (1984) in order to control for unobserved heterogeneity in hazard
rates and used for example by Mroz (1999) to estimate the effects of dummy endogenous variables.
The approach is equivalent to a correlated random effects model in which the main idea is that
unobserved heterogeneity affecting opinions about cannabis policies and unobserved heterogeneity
affecting cannabis use dynamics can be correlated, i.e. they come from a joint mixing distribution.
The assumption on support points of this joint distribution defines the types of individuals regarding
opinions and cannabis use. If, for example, conditional on observed characteristics there are two
types of individuals in terms of uptake of cannabis and two types in terms of quitting cannabis,
then there could be four types of individuals in terms of cannabis dynamics. If in addition to this
conditional on unobserved characteristics there are two types of individuals in terms of opinions on
cannabis policy, then there could be eight types of individuals in terms of cannabis dynamics and
opinions on cannabis policy. However, it could also be that there are only two types of individuals
in terms of cannabis dynamics: Individuals who are inclined to used cannabis and individuals who
will never start using cannabis. If this is the case, then there could be four types of individuals:
Those who are more in favor of cannabis policies and more likely to use drugs, those who are
less in favor of cannabis policies and more likely to use drugs, those who are more in favor of
liberal drug policies and more likely to abstain from drugs and those who are against liberal drug
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policies and more likely to abstain from drugs. Finally, if there is a perfect correlation between
unobserved heterogeneity behind cannabis use dynamics and opinions, only the first and the last
types are identified. An important advantage of using the functional form assumptions behind this
approach is that identification is achieved without relying on exclusion restrictions which can be
very challenging to find because cannabis use is likely to be affected by the same determinants as
opinions on cannabis policy.
5 Parameter Estimates
5.1 Cannabis use dynamics
The parameter estimates of the various models are obtained through the method of maximum
likelihood. The parameter estimates of the mixed proportional hazard models describing starting
rates and quitting rates of cannabis use are presented in Table 2. The first column presents the
results for the starting rates. The parameter estimate for female is found to be negative and
significant. Thus, as in previous studies we find that on average females start using cannabis at a
later age. Religiosity of the parents during the childhood of respondents is found to be significantly
negative. So, as the parents are more religious, the age of initiation to cannabis use increases.
Migrant status of the individual is found to be insignificant. Moreover, the degree of urbanization
of the municipality has a significant effect on the uptake of cannabis indicating that individuals
residing in highly urban areas start using cannabis at earlier ages. The most likely reasons are
that cannabis happens to be more available and living styles of individuals might make them more
vulnerable to the risk of cannabis use in highly urban regions. Educational attainment does not
seem to affect the uptake of cannabis.6 Finally, there is a clear cohort effect since age at the time of
the survey is an important determinant of cannabis uptake. Older cohorts were less likely to start
using cannabis. In line with figure 2, age dependency parameters indicate that there is a peak in
the uptake of cannabis at age 17 and another peak at age 19. The mass point estimates of column
1 show that unobserved heterogeneity is indeed significant in the data at hand. The estimate of
-1.25 for α implies that 22% of the respondents have a high starting rate of cannabis use whereas
78% of them have a substantially lower starting rate.
Column 2 of Table 2 presents the parameter estimates for quitting rates. We find that females
are not only more likely to start using cannabis at later ages but they are also more likely to
6We assume that educational attainment represents ability since many individuals start using cannabis before
finishing school.
13
quit at earlier ages. The parameter estimate for the first urbanization category is negative and
significant, indicating that those who live in highly urban areas quit using cannabis at later ages.
Lower educated individuals have a smaller quit rate and individuals from the older birth cohorts
have a smaller quit rate as well. Finally, we find that those who start using cannabis at a later
age quit earlier, i.e. early starters quit late. Conditional on the observed characteristics we did
not find evidence of the presence of unobserved heterogeneity in the quit rate. If we estimate a
joint model of cannabis starting and cannabis quitting we find that there is correlation between
the two processes through unobserved heterogeneity. However, the second LR-test reported at
the bottom of the table compares the independent models of cannabis uptake and cannabis quits
against the correlated model. As shown we cannot reject the hypothesis that the two processes are
independent.
5.2 Opinions on cannabis use – baseline parameter estimates
Table 3 presents our baseline parameter estimates. The results for the univariate ordered probit
model for the first policy statement – cannabis should be legalized – are shown in the first column.
We found no evidence of unobserved heterogeneity having a significant effect. The parameter
estimates of both past use and current use of cannabis are positive and significant indicating that
both self-interest and information may have an effect on opinions. However, the estimates in the first
column are based on the assumption that the decision to use cannabis is exogenous to the opinions
regarding cannabis policies. The correlated models whose parameter estimates are presented in
the second column of Table 3 are obtained after controlling for possible endogeneity. Now, we
are able to identify two mass-point in the ordered probit for opinions indicating that once we
take correlation with cannabis use dynamics in account there is unobserved heterogeneity affecting
opinions.7 Clearly, the parameter estimates of cannabis use status become smaller in absolute terms
indicating that part of the effects found in the univariate model are due to correlated unobserved
heterogeneity. The remaining effect may be interpreted as causal. The second LR test shows that
past and current cannabis use have significant effects on opinion on cannabis legalization while the
third LR test shows that the effect of past cannabis use is significantly smaller than the effect of
current cannabis use. The opinions of current cannabis users are expected to be affected by both
self-interest and information. The opinions of past cannabis users are not affected by self-interest
simply because they are no longer users. Thus, for them their parameter estimates reflect only the
7The first Likelihood Ratio test-statistic has a value of 6.6 which is significant with 1 degree of freedom (εb).
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effect of information about cannabis use. The results obtained for past users indicate that cannabis
may not be as harmful as they originally thought or as non-users are inclined to think. Past users
of cannabis – knowing about cannabis use more than never users – are more likely to support
liberal policies. Since the parameter estimate for current users is larger in absolute terms than the
parameter estimate for past users there is also evidence of self-interest influencing opinions. Indeed
likelihood ratio test 3 in Table 3 shows that we strongly reject the hypothesis that current and past
use of cannabis have the same effect on opinions.
5.3 Robustness checks: Sensitivity to policy statements
Table 4 presents the results of a sensitivity analysis focusing on opinions about different types of
cannabis policy. For reasons of comparison panel a replicates the main findings of Table 3. Panel b
present the results of the same correlated parameter estimates for the second policy statement on
coffeeshops: It should be permitted to sell cannabis at coffeeshops. We obtain very similar results.
Both current use of cannabis and past use of cannabis have positive and significant effects on
opinions. In panel b of column (2), similar to column 2 of Table 3, the parameter estimate of
current use is found to be twice as large as the coefficient estimate of past use.8 This suggests
that the magnitude of the effect of self-interest is almost the same as that of inside information.
For opinions on the first and the second type of cannabis policy there is a causal effect from past
cannabis use to opinions. Individuals that used cannabis in the past changed their opinion after
they had personal experience with cannabis towards a more liberal policy. They became more
likely to support no-prohibition and more likely to support cannabis legalization. This suggests
that cannabis use is not as harmful as they originally thought.
Panels c to f of Table 1 give information about opinions on other drug policy statements
which are not directly related to availability of cannabis. For all these policies, the distribution
of the responses is very skewed. Almost 90% of the individuals agree with the statements that
coffeeshops should not sell cannabis to people below 18 years old, the government should organize
education campaigns against drugs, there should not be coffeeshops in the vicinity of schools and the
government should ensure that schools organize education campaigns against drugs. The percentages
8Note that for the second policy, we can identify a significant unobserved heterogeneity in the univariate model
although the estimated probability parameter is not well-identified. For this opinion, we can compare univariate
models with unobserved heterogeneity and the correlated models through likelihood ratio tests. Once we performed
such a test, the results indicated that we fail to reject the correlated model against the univariate one. Therefore there
is further evidence supporting the findings of the previous LR tests that correlation between unobserved heterogeneity
affecting opinions and cannabis use dynamics is significant.
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of those who agree with a specific cannabis policy remain high irrespective of the user status.
Nevertheless, to investigate whether there was a causal effect from cannabis use to opinions we
performed a similar type of analysis as for the two main policy statements that referred to cannabis
prohibition and cannabis legalization. Since the following policy statements are not directly about
availability of cannabis, they serve as falsification analysis on the self-interest aspect of cannabis
use.
Panels c and d of Table 4 present the parameter estimates of the effects of current and past
cannabis use on restriction on sale of cannabis.9 Concerning no sale of cannabis to youngsters there
is correlation with user status but this disappears once correlated unobserved heterogeneity is taken
into account. Apparently, individuals who started using cannabis did not change their opinion on
no sale of cannabis to youngsters because they started using cannabis. They had a different opinion
all along. They were less likely to support the idea of no sale of cannabis to youngsters anyway. The
findings for the statement that there should be no coffeeshops near schools is somewhat different.
In order to explore the possible reason behind the significant negative parameter estimate we
performed the same correlated analysis by dividing the current cannabis use variable into 3 parts:
those who frequently (more than once) used cannabis in the last 30 days, those who used cannabis
only once in the last 30 days but started using cannabis at an earlier age and those who for the
first time used cannabis only once in the last 30 days. This distinction shows that the negative
effect is located among those who used cannabis for the first time in the last 30 days, which has a
very small number of observations. Once they are ignored, there is no effect. Moreover since these
people cannot accumulate inside information from one time use and they are mostly below 25 years
old, we argue that self-interest plays a small role.10
Panels e and f of Table 4 show the main parameter estimates for statements on education
programs. For education campaigns there is no big difference between the univariate model and the
correlated model. This suggests that initially opinions were not different but once some individuals
started using cannabis they changed their minds. Moreover, the fact that there is no difference
between the effects of past use and current use suggests that it is inside information that is driving
the results. Apparently, after personal experience with cannabis, some individuals were less inclined
to support education campaigns because they thought there was less need for such campaigns. For
drugs education at school, there is no difference in opinions according to user status.
9See also Appendix 2.
10Making the same distinction in 2 main legalization policies whose results are given in Table 3 did not make
any changes. This distinction seems to make a difference only for this specific policy statement on the location of
coffeeshops.
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All in all, the findings for the specific types of drug policy show that cannabis use did not have
a big effect on opinions and if it did such as is the case for education campaigns, inside information
is driving the results.11 As expected self-interest does not play a significant role in shaping opinions
about these policy statements.
5.4 Robustness checks: placebo analysis
In order to investigate whether the results obtained on the first two policy statements about
cannabis legalization are driven by some overlooked unobserved confounding factors, we perform
placebo analysis investigating the effect of past and current cannabis use on opinions about policies
unrelated to cannabis use.
In the first placebo analysis we use information about opinions on various types of alcohol
policy all aiming at restricting access to alcohol. The proposed policies are: no sale of alcohol
in supermarkets, banning alcohol advertisements, no sale of alcohol to youngsters under age 16,
no happy hours in bars and discos, no sale of alcohol in places which are frequently visited by
youngsters. Table 5 presents the results. The first column presents the results of univariate models
in which unobserved heterogeneity and correlation with cannabis use dynamics is ignored. For all
statements about restricting alcohol availability, current and past use of cannabis have significant
negative effects. The second column presents the results of the correlated models where we take
account of correlation between opinions and cannabis use dynamics through correlated unobserved
heterogeneity. For the first two statement there is no significant correlation between unobserved
heterogeneity affecting opinions and cannabis use dynamics, but we cannot reject the joint hypoth-
esis of no significant effects of cannabis use on opinions in the correlated models. For the last three
statements we do find significant correlation between unobserved heterogeneity affecting opinions
and cannabis use dynamics but here too we find no causal effect of cannabis use on opinions about
restricting alcohol availability in the correlated models. The reason behind why there are significant
negative effects in univariate models but not in correlated models is that unobserved factors related
to cannabis use are likely to be correlated with alcohol consumption and therefore opinions about
alcohol legislation, which is ignored by the first model. In correlated models such correlation is
taken into account and presented coefficients show causal effects of cannabis use on opinions about
alcohol availability. As expected there is no causal effect.
There is a strand of literature on substance use claiming that alcohol use and drug use can
11The exception to these findings is the negative of current cannabis use on support for the ban of coffeeshops near
schools. It is hard to imagine that this has a causal interpretation.
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be complementary. If that is true, then our expectation about no-causal effect of cannabis use
on opinions toward alcohol availability no longer holds. Therefore we perform a second set of
placebo analysis using opinions about policy statements which are unrelated to substance use.
Table 6 presents the parameter estimates of these new placebo analysis. In the first panel, we use
information about opinions on “The state should no longer give students a study grant but only a
study loan under favorable conditions”. In both univariate and correlated models there is no effect
of cannabis use on opinions. In the second panel, we use information about opinions on “Citizens
should have more influence on government policies”. Again there is no effect of cannabis use. It
does not seem to be the case that cannabis users and non-users are systematically different in
responses given to policy statements regardless of the nature of the policies.12
5.5 Robustness checks: Sensitivity to model specifications
As a further set of robustness checks, we investigate the sensitivity of our baseline results to various
model specifications. Table 7 presents the results of some of these robustness checks. Panel (a)
repeats our baseline results. In panel (b) we remove education dummies from starting rate analysis
as these dummies are expected to be endogenous in age of onset of cannabis use. The presented
results show that our conclusion remains the same. Panel (c) presents the results when we add
political preference dummies in the starting rates. Again our conclusion remains the same.
One issue with retrospective responses about substance use is that there might be measurement
errors due to recall bias. In order to see if our results are sensitive to such a recall bias, we restrict
our sample to a much younger cohort as they are expected to recall more accurately. Panel (d)
presents the results of this estimation where we use information on individuals who were born after
1969. Although we lose almost half of our main sample, we still obtain similar results.
In panel (e), we investigate the sensitivity of the effect of current use of cannabis to the intensity
of use in the last 30 days. Respondent in the LISS panel also report how many days a week on
average they used cannabis in the last 30 days. In order to use this information, we divide current
use variable into 4 parts depending on the intensity of use. Coefficient estimates in panel (e) indicate
that even for those who used cannabis only one day a week on average, there is a causal effect on
opinions. However, a likelihood ratio test indicates that for those who used cannabis only one day a
week on average or less, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that coefficient estimates of current use
12Note that for both of these policy statements we have to match Alcohol and Drugs study of LISS panel with
other studies of the panel, which causes a substantial loss in the number of observations. However dynamics and
patterns of cannabis use in these smaller samples is found to be very similar to what we have in the main sample of
our study.
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and past use are the same. It seems that for those who very rarely use cannabis, inside information
is driving the results rather than self-interest, which is consistent with our interpretations of the
results. Panel (f) investigates the effect of duration of cannabis use. The coefficient estimate of
duration is found to be positive but insignificant.
In the last couple of robustness checks presented in Table 7, we investigate other possible
mechanisms that can harm our interpretation of the results. We interpret the positive effect of past
use of cannabis on the support given to cannabis legalization as an evidence that those who used
cannabis in the past have superior information about cannabis use and costs/benefits related to it.
That is why we conclude that cannabis use may not be as harmful as it is originally thought. An
alternative mechanism can be that both past cannabis use and opinions about cannabis legalization
are driven by peer effects (Williams et al. (2011)). Panel (g) shows that controlling for peer use
of cannabis does not cause considerable changes in our conclusion.13 Another mechanism could be
that those who used cannabis have engaged with some negative aspects of drug markets such as
crime even though possession and use of soft drugs are not criminal offenses in the Netherlands.
Such people might be in favor of legalization not because they think cannabis is not substantially
detrimental but because legalization can be a way of reducing criminal activity related to drugs.
Panel (h) presents the results after controlling for opinions of the respondents about criminal
nature14 of the drug market. Again our conclusion remains the same.15
Finally, we estimated ordered logit models with discrete unobserved heterogeneity to re-analyze
the effect of past and current use of cannabis on opinions about two legalization policies. The prob-
abilities for the ordered logit specification of opinions conditional on observable and unobservable
characteristics are defined as
Pr(y = 1|x3, ε) = F (µ1 − x′3βp − ε)
Pr(y = 2|x3, ε) = F (µ2 − x′3βp − ε)− F (µ1 − x′3βp − ε)
.
Pr(y = 5|x3, ε) = 1− F (µ4 − x′3βp − ε)
. (13)
where F (.) is cumulative density function of the logistic distribution. Although not reported here
13LISS panel also has information on peer use: The respondents are asked if they have family members or friends
who use cannabis. They report “no”, “1 person” or “several people”.
14The respondent in LISS panel also report their opinions about the following statement on a scale of 1-to-7: “The
drugs problem should first of all be considered as a criminal issue”.
15One remaining mechanism is the reverse causality. If opinions about cannabis legalization are formed earlier in
life and if they are rigid in the sense that they do not change over time, then opinions might be driving cannabis use
instead.
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the parameter estimates of univariate and correlated models with ordered logit are found to be
qualitatively and quantitatively very similar to those in Table 3.16 Thus, we conclude that the
results are not peculiar to the assumption of normality. Furthermore as a final robustness analysis
we estimated the univariate and correlated models by fitting opinion variables into a scale from




1 (Definitely disagree or Disagree) if y∗ ≤ µ1
2 (Indifferent) if µ1<y
∗ ≤ µ2
3 (Agree or Definitely agree) if µ2<y
∗
(14)
The rest of the model specifications is kept the same. The parameter estimates of this model are
found to be very similar to those which are reported until now, indicating that results are mainly
driven by differences between individuals who agree or disagree to given policy statements; not by
differences between those who agree (disagree) or definitely agree (definitely disagree).
5.6 Magnitude of the effects
To indicate the magnitude of the effect of past and current use of cannabis, we simulated the
probabilities for each alternative in the ordered response variable. The simulation results are given
in Table 8. The first panel presents the results for the first policy statement (cannabis should be
legalized). As shown there is a large effect of cannabis use. The estimated probability of agreeing
with the idea of no-prohibition is 33% for our reference person who has never used cannabis which
is reported in row (3). If that reference person used cannabis in the past, support for no-prohibition
increases to 60% and if this person is still using cannabis the support for no-prohibition jumps to
81%. Similarly, the second panel presents the simulation results for the second policy statement
on cannabis legalization. The numbers in the table indicate that estimated probability of agreeing
with the idea of selling cannabis at coffeeshops is 36% for a never user reference person. This
probability increases to 53% if this reference person is a past-user and to 74% if the individual
is a current user. Similarly the probability of disagreeing decreases from 43% to 26% and 11%,
respectively. A comparison of these figures with the unconditional distribution given in Table 1
shows that even though difference between cannabis users and non-users decreases after controlling
for observable and unobservable factors, it remains as considerable.
16As expected the coefficient estimates in logit models are higher than those in probit models. A rescaling of logit
estimates with 1.7 gave almost the same coefficient estimates as those given by probit models.
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6 Conclusions
Opinions on cannabis policy are interesting to study as they provide some indication for public
support of certain types of policy. From previous studies and a simple cross-country comparisons
it appears that support for legalization of cannabis increases with the share of cannabis users.
Interesting as this may be in itself, the fact that cannabis users are more in favor of legalizing
cannabis does not necessarily imply that opinions are influenced by cannabis use in a causal way.
Cannabis users may be more in favor of legalization because individuals who are more likely to
consume cannabis are also more in favor of legalization without the personal experience affecting
opinions. Knowing whether or not there is a causal effect from cannabis use is interesting because
if so, it reveals how potential dangers of cannabis use are assessed. If cannabis use increases the
support for legalizing cannabis then this implicitly reveals that cannabis use may not be so harmful
as individuals were inclined to think before they started using cannabis. However, such a causal
effect may also have to do with self-interest, i.e. the expectation that cannabis legalization will
induce easier access and perhaps lower prices.
We follow a research strategy that enables us to distinguish between self-interest and inside
information about potential harmful effects. We make a distinction between the causal effects of
current cannabis use and past cannabis use. The effect of current cannabis use on opinions about
legalization is a mixture of self-interest and information; the effect of past cannabis use has to do
with information only. Whereas self-interest presumably makes individuals more likely to be in
favor of legalization this is not necessarily the case for information. It could be that past users
regret the fact that they ever used cannabis and this might make them less in favor of legalization.
We use data from a 2008 survey which includes detailed questions about cannabis use and
opinions about cannabis policies in the Netherlands. After an extensive sensitivity analysis we
conclude that there is a causal effect of personal experience with cannabis use on the support given
to more liberal cannabis policies. Those who currently use cannabis and those who used it in the
past are more in favor of legalization. The opinion of current cannabis users may be driven by
self-interest and inside information but the opinion of past users will be driven mainly by inside
information about the dangers of cannabis use. From the significance of the effect of past cannabis
use we conclude that cannabis use may not be as harmful as cannabis users originally thought it
was and non-users are inclined to think.
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Appendix 1: Details on the LISS data
The LISS survey is administered by CentERdata, a research institute of Tilburg University. The
data used in our study are from one of the special cross-sectional surveys conducted in November
2008. The online survey is addressed to a representative Dutch sample. Table 9 provides a de-
scription and summary statistics of the variables used in our analysis. Most of the descriptions are
self-explanatory. For the question on political preferences we grouped the various parties in the
Netherlands as follows: Conservatives (VVD, Trots op Nederland, PVV), Left wing (PvdA, SP,
Groen-Links, D66, Partij van de Dieren), Center (CDA, Christenunie, SGP), Others (other party,
would rather not say, would not vote, is not entitled to vote, blank vote, does not know).
Appendix 2: Opinions on cannabis policy apart from legalization
Apart from the main policy statements on cannabis legalization, the LISS survey includes various
other statements on drug policy. Table 4 panel c presents the parameter estimates on opinions
about the statement that the government should ensure that coffeeshops don’t sell cannabis to
people below 18 years old. As with prohibition and legalization, respondents are asked to report
their opinions in a scale from 1 to 5; 5 indicating definite agreement. A study by Abraham et al.
(1999) shows that around 40% of the individuals aged between 12 and 17 obtain the cannabis that
they use from coffeeshops. This is a striking percentage considering the regulations on coffeeshops
which forbid selling of cannabis to people below 18 years old. Panel d of the same table present
the parameter estimates on opinions about the statement that coffeeshops should not be located
in the vicinity of schools. In 2008, it was decided that all municipalities would ban coffee shops
which are located within a distance of 250 meters of schools for secondary education. The main
purpose of the law was to prevent pupils from considering soft drugs as non-detrimental or normal
and prevent them from constantly coming across drug purchase points. The distance of 250 meter
is to be increased to 350 meter as of January 2014 (Van Laar et al. (2011)). The results show
that even though there seems to be an effect of past use of cannabis on opinions about these two
policy statements, this effect is solely due to correlations. In correlated models the effect of past
use of cannabis on opinions virtually disappears. Current use of cannabis displays slightly different
results. There is no causal effect of current use of cannabis on opinions about sale of cannabis to
youngsters at coffeeshops. There is, however, an effect on opinions about coffeeshops being close to
schools. Those who currently uses cannabis seem to worry less about the existence of coffeeshops
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in the vicinity of schools. We show that this effect solely comes through those who used cannabis
for the first time in the last 30 days. Since these people are likely to be less than 25 years old
(cannabis use literature shows that people above 25 years old are very unlikely to use start using
cannabis), self-interest can play a role. Likelihood ratio tests on the joint significance of past and
current use of cannabis show that only in the case of the second policy statement the parameters
are jointly significant.
Table 4 panel e shows the parameter estimates on opinions regarding the statement that the
government should conduct drug education campaigns. From a likelihood ratio test it appears that
in the correlated model we cannot reject the hypothesis that there is an effect of cannabis use on
opinions. However, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the effect is the same for current cannabis
use and past cannabis use. This suggests that self-interest does not play a role and the causal effect
has to do with inside information. Finally, panel f presents the parameter estimates on opinions
about the statement that the government should ensure that schools provide drug education. For
these policy statements, the parameter estimates of current and past use of cannabis are found to
be jointly insignificant. For the rest of the policy statements used in the falsification analysis and
reported in Tables 5 and 6, we do not find any causal effect of cannabis use which gives empirical
support to our main findings.
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Table 1: Opinions on various types of cannabis policy (percentages)
Definitely Definitely
disagree Disagree Indifferent Agree agree Total N P-valuea
a. Cannabis legalized
1 All 16 18 21 28 17 100 2016
2 Current users 1 2 8 33 56 100 96 0.00
3 Past users 4 5 14 43 34 100 529 0.00
4 Never users 21 24 24 22 9 100 1391 0.00
b. Coffeeshops permitted
1 All 19 16 19 36 10 100 2015
2 Current users 3 5 7 45 40 100 95 0.00
3 Past users 6 7 13 57 17 100 529 0.00
4 Never users 25 20 22 27 5 100 1391 0.00
c. No sale to youngsters
1 All 1 3 12 50 34 100 2015
2 Current users 3 7 15 50 26 100 95 0.01
3 Past users 1 4 11 53 31 100 529 0.04
4 Never users 1 2 12 50 36 100 1391 0.00
d. No coffeeshops near schools
1 All 2 4 11 39 44 100 2014
2 Current users 5 11 27 33 24 100 95 0.00
3 Past users 2 5 15 47 31 100 528 0.00
4 Never users 2 3 8 36 50 100 1390 0.00
e. Education campaigns
1 All 1 1 6 52 40 100 2012
2 Current users 1 1 10 52 36 100 95 0.00
3 Past users 1 1 6 57 35 100 528 0.00
4 Never users 1 1 6 50 42 100 1389 0.00
f. Drugs education at schools
1 All 1 1 8 53 36 100 2005
2 Current users 2 5 14 50 29 100 95 0.49
3 Past users 1 2 9 58 30 100 528 0.03
4 Never users 1 1 7 2 39 100 1382 0.02
a shows the p-value of a chi-square test of independence with null hypothesis that the reported difference in opinion categories
between current (past, never) users and never (never, ever) users is not significant. For most of the cases we reject this null
hypothesis.
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Table 2: Dynamics in cannabis use: parameter estimates of mixed proportional hazard models on
starting age and quitting age of cannabis use.
Bivariate
Starting rates Quitting rates
(1) (2)
Female -0.68 (5.0)** 0.33 (2.6)**
Religion -0.22 (5.2)** 0.00 (0.1)
Migrant -0.27 (1.3) 0.06 (0.3)
Urban 1 0.92 (3.8)** -0.76 (3.2)**
Urban 2 0.21 (1.0) -0.38 (1.8)*
Urban 3 0.28 (1.2) -0.41 (1.8)*
Secondary1 -0.03 (0.1) 0.46 (1.7)*
Secondary2 0.08 (0.2) 1.14 (3.6)**
Vocational1 -0.37 (1.1) 0.62 (2.4)**
Vocational2 0.15 (0.5) 1.00 (3.6)**
University 0.31 (0.8) 1.06 (3.4)**
Age25-34 -0.11 (0.6) -0.36 (1.7)*
Age35-44 -1.27 (6.1)** -0.89 (4.5)**
Age45+ -2.05 (7.3)** -0.85 (2.4)**
Age of onset 0.76 (5.6)**
Age dependence
Age dep. 20+ 1.39 (3.7)**
Age dep. 19 2.98 (8.2)**
Age dep. 18 2.50 (6.6)**
Age dep. 17 3.26 (9.7)**
Age dep. 16 2.72 (8.3)**
Age dep. 15 2.89 (9.9)**
Age dep. 14 1.86 (6.4)**
Age dep. 13 0.94 (3.0)**
Unobserved heterogeneity
ua -2.49 (5.3)** -3.11 (7.9)**
ub -5.95 (14.1)** -
α -1.25 (8.5)** -
-Loglikelihood 2921.6
LR test 1 4.6
LR test 2 0.4
Observations 2016
The Likelihood Ratio test 1 indicates that unobserved heterogeneity is not significant in the quitting rates. Note that d.o.f of
the test is 2 since when ub = 0, α is not identified in the quitting rates estimation.
The Likelihood Ratio test 2 compares the independent models against the correlated model and shows that we cannot reject
that the two processes are independent; absolute t-statistics in parentheses. * and ** are for statistical significance at 10%
and 5%, respectively.
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Table 3: Parameter estimates of the effect of past and current use of cannabis on the cannabis
policy statement: Cannabis should be legalized.
Univariate Correlated
(1) (2)
Past cannabis use 0.97 (16.0)** 0.71 (5.7)**
Current cannabis use 1.60 (10.5)** 1.35 (7.8)**
Female 0.01 (0.2) -0.03 (0.6)
Religion -0.05 (3.1)** -0.05 (3.6)**
Migrant -0.07 (1.0) -0.11 (1.6)
Urban 1 -0.12 (1.2) -0.07 (0.7)
Urban 2 -0.09 (1.2) -0.08 (1.0)
Urban 3 -0.12 (1.4) -0.10 (1.1)
Secondary1 0.04 (0.1) -0.03 (0.2)
Secondary2 0.30 (2.2)** 0.26 (2.1)**
Vocational1 0.21 (1.6) 0.13 (1.2)
Vocational2 0.41 (3.1)** 0.37 (3.2)**
University 0.56 (3.7)** 0.53 (3.8)**
Couple without child -0.03 (0.5) -0.05 (0.5)
Couple with child -0.27 (3.7)** -0.28 (3.7)**
Single with child -0.06 (0.6) -0.09 (0.7)
Other -0.33 (1.3) -0.39 (1.5)
Age 25-34 -0.06 (0.7) -0.09 (1.4)
Age 35-44 -0.24 (2.9)** -0.29 (3.6)**
Age 45+ -0.20 (2.1)** -0.25 (2.7)**
Left wing 0.28 (3.8)** 0.26 (3.8)**
Center -0.31 (3.4)** -0.29 (3.5)**
Others -0.20 (2.0)** -0.18 (2.0)**
I don’t know 0.01 (0.2) 0.00 (0.0)
εa 1.5 (7.3)** 0.73 (3.0)**
εb 0.43 (2.3)**
α -1.26 (8.7)**
γ1 1.01 (52.7)** 1.02 (50.8)**
µ2 [1.1] [1.0]
γ2 0.82 (44.4)** 0.81 (44.1)**
µ3 [1.8] [1.7]
γ3 0.81 (41.2)** 0.82 (41.6)**
µ4 [2.5] [2.4]
-Loglikelihood 5783.25 5779.9
LR test 1 6.6 **
LR test 2 50.1 **
LR test 3 24.8 **
Observations 2016 2016
The LR test 1 tests the univariate model against the correlated model. The Likelihood Ratio test 2 is for the joint significance
of cannabis use variables. The LR test 3 is for equality of the parameters of past cannabis use and current cannabis use.
Absolute t-statistics in parentheses. * and ** are for statistical significance at 10% and 5%, respectively.
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Table 4: Parameter estimates of the effect of past and current cannabis use on support for various




Past cannabis use 0.97 (16.0)** 0.71 (5.7)**





Past cannabis use 0.80 (13.1)** 0.47 (4.0)**




c. No sale to youngsters
Past cannabis use -0.54 (5.0)** -0.04 (0.3)




d. No coffeeshops near schools
Past cannabis use -0.31 (4.9)** 0.01 (0.3)





Past cannabis use -0.13 (2.1)* -0.17 (1.6)




f. Drugs education at schools
Past cannabis use -0.06 (1.0) -0.05 (0.3)




The numbers of observations are 2016, 2015, 2015, 2014, 2012 and 2005, respectively.
The LR test 1 tests the univariate model against the correlated model. The Likelihood Ratio test 2 is for the joint significance
of cannabis use variables. The LR test 3 is for equality of the parameters of past cannabis use and current cannabis use.
Absolute t-statistics in parentheses. * and ** are for statistical significance at 10% and 5%, respectively.
For opinions b & c, LR tests indicate that unobserved heterogeneity is significant in opinions in the univariate models
although the distribution is not well-identified. For these two opinions we also compared univariate models with unobserved
heterogeneity and the correlated models through likelihood ratio tests. The results indicate that in both cases we fail to reject
the correlated model against the univariate one, which supports the findings of the previous LR tests that correlation between
unobserved heterogeneity affecting opinions and cannabis use dynamics is significant.
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Table 5: Parameter estimates of placebo regressions: Opinions on alcohol availability.
Univariate Correlated
(1) (2)
a. No alcohol in the supermarkets
Past cannabis use -0.43 (7.3)** -0.29 (2.3)**




b. Alcohol advertisements should be banned
Past cannabis use -0.31 (5.2)** -0.21 (1.7)*




c. No alcohol to those under 16
Past cannabis use -0.13 (2.0)** 0.16 (1.2)




d. No happy hours in bars and discos
Past cannabis use -0.31 (5.5)** 0.01 (0.2)




e. No alcohol sale at places which are frequently visited
by those under 16
Past cannabis use -0.48 (7.8)** -0.19 (1.5)




The number of observations is 2016.
The LR test 1 tests the univariate model against the correlated model. The Likelihood Ratio test 2 is for the joint significance
of cannabis use variables. The LR test 3 is for equality of the parameters of past cannabis use and current cannabis use.
Absolute t-statistics in parentheses. * and ** are for statistical significance at 10% and 5%, respectively.
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a. The state should no longer give students a study grant,
but only a study loan under favorable conditions
Past cannabis use -0.04 (0.1) -0.01 (0.3)





b. Citizens should have more influence on government policy
Past cannabis use 0.19 (1.9)* -0.18 (1.0)





The LR test 1 tests the univariate model against the correlated model. The Likelihood Ratio test 2 is for the joint significance
of cannabis use variables. The LR test 3 is for equality of the parameters of past cannabis use and current cannabis use.
Absolute t-statistics in parentheses. * and ** are for statistical significance at 10% and 5%, respectively.
Although the sample size drops considerably after matching different data sets, pattern of cannabis use remains the same.
The percentage of ever users, past users and current users are 30%, 25% and 4% for panel a and 31%, 25% and 5% for panel
b, respectively. Note that these are very much the same as those reported in Table 9 for the main sample.
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Past cannabis use 0.71 (5.7)** 5779.9 2016
Current cannabis use 1.35 (7.8)**
b. No education in the starting rates
Past cannabis use 0.72 (5.7)** 5786.1 2016
Current cannabis use 1.36 (7.8)**
c. Political preferences in the starting rates
Past cannabis use 0.69 (5.4)** 5744.11 2016
Current cannabis use 1.33 (7.6)**
d. Individuals born after 1969
Past cannabis use 0.51 (3.0)** 3442.60 1149
Current cannabis use 1.18 (5.6)**
e. On average how many days a week cannabis is used by the respondent
Past cannabis use 0.71 (5.5)**
6-7 days a week 1.62 (5.3)** 5778.85 2016
2-5 days a week 1.45 (3.5)**
1 day a week 1.16 (4.6)**
Less than 1 day 1.23 (4.4)**
f. Duration of use
Past cannabis use 0.72 (5.6)**
Current cannabis use 1.30 (5.6)** 5779.8 2016
xDuration of use 0.01 (0.3)
g. Peer and family influences
Past cannabis use 0.44 (3.7)** 5713.47 2011
Current cannabis use 1.03 (5.8)**
1 friend/family using cannabis 0.35 (5.0)**
Less than 1 friend/family using cannabis 0.68 (10.6)**
h. Criminal aspect of drug use
Past cannabis use 0.65 (5.0)** 5591.13 2007
Current cannabis use 1.11 (6.5)**
Criminal aspect of drug use -0.27 (20.5)**
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Table 8: Simulations of the effects of past and current use of cannabis on opinions about cannabis




disagree Indifferent Agree agree Total
a. Cannabis should be legalized
1. Current use 1 5 13 37 44 100
2. Past use 6 12 21 38 22 100
3. Never use 20 23 25 26 7 100
b. Legalization: It should be permitted to sell cannabis at the coffeeshops
1. Current use 4 7 15 53 21 100
2. Past use 12 14 20 44 9 100
3. Never use 23 20 22 32 4 100
The simulations are based on the parameter estimates of the correlated models presented in Table 3; the reference person has










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Percentage of those who support a policy of cannabis regulation and percentage of ever
cannabis users among youngsters in 27 European Union countries and the USA
Source: EU: European Commission (2011); youngsters: 15-24 years USA: 2013; youngsters: 18-29
years
36
Figure 2: Starting rates and cumulative starting probabilities cannabis use
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